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SUMMARY 
The first round of EU Eastern Enlargement was completed with the 
accession of 10 Central Eastern European countries on May 1, 2004. 
This economic integration will have impacts on the economies of the 
accession countries and the EU 15. Public perceptions of Eastern 
Enlargement have not been very promising in Germany, but as it has 
the closest economic ties with the new members and is the biggest 
net contributor to the EU budget, it is widely expected to face the 
strongest impacts of any of the EU 15. On the one hand, there will 
be fiscal costs to bear, and on the other, there will be effects on 
FDI, trade, economic growth and general welfare, and significantly, 
some potential East–West migration. These effects will be felt on la-
bour markets and in the welfare system in Germany, bringing bene-
fits to some groups and costs to others. This paper presents some 
estimates of these effects and their impacts on the German economy, 
with closer attention being paid to certain crucial regions directly 
bordering the Central Eastern European countries. 
 
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
3 CEECs Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
5 CEECs 3 CEECs plus Estonia and Slovenia. 
10 CEECs The ten countries of the first Enlargement round: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
10a-CEECs The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slo-
venia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
CAP The EU Common Agricultural Policies. 
CEECs All Central-Eastern European countries seen as potential accession countries in 
envisaged Enlargement rounds, plus Cyprus and Malta (not geographically in 
Central-Eastern Europe. 
CET Common external tariffs. 
DIW Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin. 
EC European Commission. 
EC study Fertig and Schmidt 2000. 
EIC European Integration Consortium. 
EIC/DIW study Boeri and Brücker 2000. 
EU European Union. 
EU 13 The EU 15 minus Luxembourg and Greece. 
EU 14 The EU 15 minus Germany. 
EU 15 Current EU member-states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ire-
land, Italy, Greece, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
EU 25 The EU 15 plus the 10 CEECs. 
EU 27 The EU 25 plus Bulgaria and Romania. 
EU study Keuschnigg et al. 1999. 
FDI Foreign direct investment. 
FES Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn. 
GDP Gross Domestic Product. 
HOS model The Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model. 
IFO Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich. 
IFO study Sinn et al. 2000. 
IfW Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. 
INTERREG The INTERREG Community Initiative is part of EU regional policy. Funding for 
INTERREG III comes from the European Regional Development Fund, one of the 
Structural Funds. 
IWH Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle. 
IZA Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Bonn. 
IZA study Bauer and Zimmermann 1999. 
NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
OIM Osteuropa-Institut, Munich. 
OIM report Quaisser 2001A. 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
R and D Research and Development 
WIFO Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Vienna. 
 
 5 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1990s, the German economy had 
to adjust to two shocks at the same 
time. The first was a remarkable in-
crease in the EU trade of Eastern Euro-
pean countries following the breakdown 
of the communist regimes. This growth 
in trade was greater with Germany than 
with most other Western European 
countries.1 Secondly, there were massive 
economic consequences from German 
reunification in 1990 and a huge addi-
tion to the country’s public debt. Trans-
fers to Eastern Germany rose from 40 
per cent to 46 per cent of total gross 
transfers between 1991 and 1996, 
reaching 5 per cent of West Germany’s 
GDP in 1995. Expenditures for East 
Germany were financed by higher taxes 
and on the back of public deficits. 
Germany’s budget deficit in 1996 
reached 3.4 per cent of GDP and public 
debt 60.4 per cent of GDP. The cur-
rent-account deficit increased between 
1990 and 1995 before stabilizing. Ger-
many, like other net contributors, began 
to see its negative balances with the EU 
as too high relative to its wealth, and 
insisting on a change to its EU budget 
contributions, emphasizing that the im-
minent Eastern Enlargement could not 
go ahead without a cut in Germany’s 
net contributions.2 
But in return for the fiscal costs 
of Enlargement in higher net contribu-
tions, Germany was likely to gain nota-
ble benefits from the integration of the 
10 CEECs3 according to integration theo-
                                                 
1 Keuschnigg et al. 1999, p. 1 (executive sum-
mary). 
2 Ibid., p. 1 (executive summary) and p. 1 of 
main text. 
3 Central-Eastern European countries, see the 
List of Abbreviations for a closer definition. 
rists. By removing trade barriers, the 
first EU Eastern Enlargement would 
surely increase the volumes of trade 
activities and factor movements with the 
EU 15. Furthermore, well-known theories 
of international economics predict that 
increasing volumes of international trade 
and an increase in the division of la-
bour will lead to higher incomes in real 
terms for all concerned. Positive welfare 
benefits result from static and dynamic 
efficiency gains, i.e. effects on allocation, 
investments and growth, not just ex-
tended opportunities in exports. How-
ever, as Eastern Enlargement is a case 
of regional integration, positive welfare 
and growth effects can only occur if 
the effects that create and extend trade 
activities outweigh those that simply re-
direct them, i.e. increase import activi-
ties within the EU and with non-EU 
countries. As the EU embodies a rela-
tively large free-trade area, the effects 
of redirected trade activities can be ex-
pected to be low, i.e. the trade-creating 
effects will outweigh them. 
Standard models of theories in in-
ternational economics derive the positive 
welfare effects of the international divi-
sion of labour either from relative dif-
ferences in productivity (Ricardo’s model 
of comparative advantages in costs) or 
from differences in the factor endow-
ment in production (the Heckscher–
Ohlin–Samuelson or HOS model). The 
Ricardo model determines the distribu-
tion of the gains in incomes from inte-
gration, by reference to a shift in 
world-market prices, so that the same 
level of incomes in the regions may 
eventually, although not necessarily 
emerge. This process is influenced pri-
marily by development of the terms of 
trade in the EU and the CEECs. The 
theory of comparative advantages in 
costs is, however, not very helpful for 
explaining further the impacts of East-
ern Enlargement, because it assumes a 
very extreme situation of 100 per cent 
specialization and neglects the potential 
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differences in factor endowments. As the 
current EU member-states can be con-
sidered relatively capital-abundant, 
whereas the CEECs are relatively labour-
abundant, the HOS model’s assumption 
of differences in factor endowments in 
production is a better fit for East-West 
integration. This predicts that the CEECs 
will increase exports of relatively la-
bour-intensive products to the EU 15 
after trade barriers and tariffs are re-
moved, whereas the EU 15 will concen-
trate on exporting relatively capital-
intensive products. Thereby, a change in 
demand for these products shifts the 
price relations between them. That in 
turn causes a change in relative returns 
on the factors of production, resulting 
in a gain of returns on the relatively 
abundant factor of a region, as pre-
dicted by the Stolper–Samuelson theo-
rem. For the EU 15, that will mean an 
increase in capital yields and decreasing 
wage levels. Furthermore, the Factor-
Price Equalization theorem predicts a 
levelling of returns on the factors of 
production, which eventually brings a 
sharp decline in wage levels in the EU 
15. The shift in the relative prices of 
production factors leads to a higher in-
tensity of labour in capital and labour-
intensive sectors. Since the EU 15 will 
specialize in capital-intensive products 
and reduce production of labour-
intensive ones, the effects on overall 
employment in the EU 15 are neutral. 
Nonetheless, these results are less clear 
if some of the strict assumptions of the 
HOS model, such as production with 
equal technologies, are opted out. 4 
All in all, theories of economic in-
tegration cannot supply a final, clear 
conclusion on the effects of Eastern 
Enlargement, as they discuss partly valid 
phenomena at different stages of inte-
gration.5 This paper therefore introduces 
other models and studies that have been 
                                                 
4 Quaisser, W., 2001B, pp. 20–22. 
5 Ibid., pp. 24–25. 
fitted more precisely to the specific case 
of a first EU Eastern Enlargement, as 
well as analysing and discussing its im-
pacts on the German economy. 
Section 1 presents some implica-
tions from public perceptions of an EU 
Enlargement in Germany. In Section 2, 
general macroeconomic effects of the EU 
Eastern Enlargement on Germany are 
presented, and the section also points 
out migration as the major impact, pre-
sents a model calculation on a migra-
tion potential for Germany and discusses 
the effects of migration on the German 
labour market and social welfare sys-
tem. Section 3 evaluates the net results 
on Germany, defines potential winners 
as well as losers of an Enlargement and 
points out risks and chances for Ger-
man companies in some certain crucial 
areas bordering the CEECs. Section 4 
finally sums up the results and draws a 
conclusion for future perspectives. 
1) PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF 
ENLARGEMENT – RISKS AND 
CHANCES 
A report by Tuschhoff  (2002) presents 
the results of two surveys by the Euro-
pean Commission (2001) and by Euro-
barometer (2002). Although Eastern 
Enlargement will probably affect Ger-
many to the greatest extent, less than 
20 per cent of the German respondents 
in 2002 felt they had been well in-
formed about it. It was neither a major 
concern nor a high political priority for 
them. This observation is supported by 
the low level of public opposition, with 
only 18 per cent opposing any kind of 
Enlargement. However, the Germans (14 
per cent) agree with the other EU 14 
(18 per cent) that their country will 
benefit most from Enlargement but 54 
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per cent do not foresee any major per-
sonal payoffs. Only 10 per cent expect 
some improvement, while 20 per cent 
fear a deterioration in their personal 
position, mainly based on economic rea-
sons; 72 per cent are afraid that 
Enlargement will increase unemployment, 
and 64 per cent expect immigrants to 
compete for their jobs. Furthermore, 61 
per cent believe Enlargement could lead 
to higher taxes and 58 per cent foresee 
increasing inflation, while 53 per cent 
think the Euro will decline against other 
currencies, while 52 per cent fear in-
creasing illegal immigration and drug 
traffic.6 
On most of these matters, Ger-
mans exceed the EU 15 averages. Ger-
mans obviously feel less comfortable 
about the negative economic conse-
quences of Enlargement. Only 20 per 
cent believe it will create jobs in Ger-
many or improve living standards (23 
per cent). In addition, Germans worry 
particularly about the consequences of 
immigration following an Enlargement: 
67 per cent of those expecting notable 
immigration perceive it in negative 
terms, the figure reaching 81 per cent 
among Eastern Germans. Another 85 
per cent of the latter expect unemploy-
ment to grow and 73 per cent foresee 
an increase in crime, while 70 per cent 
fear that Enlargement will fuel black 
labour markets and 65 per cent are 
afraid that the welfare system will be 
exploited. The concern about immigra-
tion has to be viewed against the fact 
that 59 per cent feel there are too 
many foreigners living in Germany al-
ready. These figures show that Germans 
are particularly concerned about immi-
gration and cross-border commuting: 55 
per cent foresee the number of com-
muters rising significantly, the main rea-
son for 79 per cent being fear that un-
employment among German workers will 
increase. Meanwhile 63 per cent expect 
                                                 
6 Ibid., pp. 25-29. 
decreasing domestic wage levels and 73 
per cent of those think this will be due 
to commuting workers.7 
In a later survey conducted by 
Eurobarometer in autumn 20038, people 
across the EU 15 were asked if they 
favour any kind of EU Eastern 
Enlargement. Of all Germans, 57 per 
cent say they do so, with 62 per cent 
in Eastern Germany and 55 per cent in 
Western Germany, while the EU 15 av-
erage was 61 per cent. On the first 
Enlargement round, 41 per cent (54 per 
cent in November 2002) of the Germans 
prefer enlarging the EU by just a few 
countries, 27 per cent (21 per cent) fa-
vour no Enlargement at all, and 15 per 
cent think all countries willing to join 
should do so. As far as a second round 
of Enlargement goes, only 38 per cent 
(42 per cent) favour it generally, with 
an EU 15 average of 47 per cent. The 
authors argue that Germans may dis-
trust a second round because of uncer-
tainties about the first round, which 
was due to start soon. 
In conclusion, it is obvious that 
the EU Enlargement is not favoured as 
a priority by the German public yet. 
The surveys suggest that people do not 
support it in large numbers, although 
they see no reason to oppose it vigor-
ously either. Many think it will not af-
fect them personally. Germans believe 
the arguments of their government and 
the EU that Enlargement will bring po-
litical advantages, but are less convinced 
about economic benefits. This is striking, 
as most experts argue that Germany 
will benefit most from Eastern Enlarge-
ment. The German public is not con-
vinced yet. It feels particularly exposed 
to waves of migration affecting the la-
bour market and welfare system. It is 
crucial to face this cautious public atti-
tude and convince the Germans that the 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 European Commission 2003C. 
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Enlargement is in their economic and 
personal interest.9 
Against that background, the fol-
lowing section reviews the fears Ger-
mans have, by detecting the economic 
impacts of a first EU Eastern Enlarge-
ment stage by stage. 
2) GENERAL MACROECO-
NOMIC EFFECTS 
This account of the general macroeco-
nomic effects of Eastern Enlargement on 
the German economy starts with an es-
timate of fiscal costs, before introducing 
calculations for trade, FDI, growth, and 
welfare effects, and finally pointing to 
the industries likely to be most affected. 
2.1. Fiscal costs–financing 
Enlargement 
The major costs for the EU 15 are fiscal 
costs in form of operational payments 
by the EU budget for structural funds 
and funds under CAP. 
Although Germany managed at the 
Berlin Summit (Agenda 2000) to reduce 
its share of payments to the EU budget 
from 25.5 per cent in 1999 to 24.8 per 
cent in 2000, then to 24.4 per cent in 
2001 and 22.6 per cent in 2002, it is 
still the biggest contributor.10 This means 
it faces the largest share of the addi-
tional fiscal costs of Enlargement. Ger-
many’s net contributions rose from EUR 
10.4 billion in 1998 to EUR 11.5 billion 
in 2000, before falling to EUR 9.5 bil-
lion in 2001 and EUR 6.1 billion in 
                                                 
9 Tuschhoff, C., 2002, pp. 25–29. 
10 See Table 1. 
2002, mainly due to exceptionally high 
operational payments to Germany after 
the floods of 2002. By then, net contri-
butions had been equivalent to an aver-
age 0.6 per cent of Germany GDP a 
year since 1996.11 But the question re-
mains by how much Germany’s net con-
tributions will rise because of the 
Enlargement. 
The volumes of additional fiscal 
burdens calculated in the Enlargement 
models differ widely. They were built on 
various scenarios with varying numbers 
of accession countries at different stages 
of reforms in the structural funds and 
CAP, some even before the Berlin Summit 
of 2000. They also included different 
assumptions about the contributions 
from the CEECs to the EU budget. The 
fiscal burdens calculated for Germany 
differ widely and conclude with costs 
far less than those in this paper. How-
ever, let us look at the findings of two: 
(1) a relatively optimistic one from the 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsfor-
schung, Berlin (DIW) in 200212 and (2) 
a rather pessimistic one from the Insti-
tut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel (IfW) in 
2003.13 These seem to be the two most 
realistic, as they assume the 10 CEECs 
that actually joined the EU on May 1, 
2004.14 For the European Council, at its 
Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, 
changed the Berlin conditions, extending 
the number of first-round countries 
from six to ten and postponing the ac-
cession from 2002 to 2004.15 
The IfW assumes for the scenario 
it considers most probable that all the 
accession countries get the same addi-
tional payments per capita from the EU 
structural funds and CAP as Spain, Por-
                                                 
11 European Commission 2003 B, 111–26; Table 
1. 
12 Weise 2002. 
13 Dicke 2003. 
14 See the List of Abbreviations. 
15 Dicke 2003, p. 35. 
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tugal and Greece. This disbursement 
means for Germany added net contribu-
tions of some EUR 32.0 billion EUR a 
year for the first round of 10 CEECs, 
EUR 58.8 billion for the later accession 
of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, and 
about EUR 105.9 billion for a potential 
accession by Russia, Ukraine and Bela-
rus. Assuming the contracts remain 
valid for 30 years, the study calculates 
a net present value for EU liabilities of 
EUR 542.6 billion for the first round, 
EUR 903.8 billion for the second and 
EUR 1,626.1 billion for a putative third 
round. This gives net present fiscal costs 
for Germany of EUR 132.4 billion, EUR 
220.5 billion and EUR 396.8 billion re-
spectively.16 Compared with the EUR 6.1 
billion in 2002, this rise in net contri-
butions raises the national debts of the 
EU 15, although the authors think it 
more likely that tax revenues will be 
used, causing budgetary imbalances. For 
Germany, they calculate a budget-deficit 
rise of 0.4 per cent for the first round 
and rather more than 0.6 per cent for 
the second.17 
The DIW works out some scenar-
ios of potential developments in the EU 
budget for 2007 and 2013, assuming 
various numbers of accession countries 
and implying various stages of reforms 
in the structural funds and CAP. It 
models accession by (1) no countries 
(EU 15), (2) ten countries (EU 25) and 
(3) twelve countries (EU 27), with (a) 
moderate, (b) medium and (c) substan-
tial reforms of the structural funds and 
CAP, or (d) an unchanged state of no 
reforms at all. For each of the nine sce-
narios, there is a breakdown of net 
contributions to the EU budget by mem-
ber-country for the years 2007 and 
2013, used in this paper to arrive at 
potential net contributions by Germany. 
In all scenarios, Germany will be by far 
the biggest net contributor among the 
                                                 
16 See Table 2. 
17 Dicke 2003, pp. 40–43. 
EU 15, far ahead of the UK, except if 
the payments are calculated per capita, 
when Germany comes second to Luxem-
bourg. In the unchanged scenario (no 
Enlargement, no reforms), Germany ends 
up with net contributions of EUR 7.3 
billion to the EU budget in 2007 and 
EUR 5.9 billion in 2013. For budget 
year 2007, Germany’s net contributions 
rise remarkably if there is enlargement 
by ten countries (EU 25), to EUR 11.1 
billion, EUR 11.6 billion with moderate 
reforms, EUR 9.8 billion with medium 
reforms, and EUR 9.5 billion with sub-
stantial reforms. If the EU is enlarged 
by twelve countries (EU 27), Germany’s 
2007 contributions rise to some EUR 
12.1 billion in the otherwise unchanged 
case, EUR 12.4 billion with moderate, 
EUR 10.6 billion with medium, and EUR 
10.4 billion with substantial reforms. For 
budget year 2013, the authors calculate 
net contributions of EUR 11.7 billion, 
12.2 billion, 9.7 billion and 9.0 billion 
for EU 25 and EUR 12.8 billion, 13.7 
billion, 10.9 billion and 10.4 billion for 
EU 27, respectively.18 
Apart from the obvious implication 
that Germany has an interest in pressing 
for substantial reforms, it is quite prob-
able that Germany’s net contributions 
will increase with Enlargement, com-
pared with some EUR 9.5 billion in 
2001 and EUR 6.1 billion in 2002. To 
what extent they rise and how much 
the current net contribution rate of 0.6 
per cent of GDP changes will depend 
on the degree to which the structural 
funds and CAP are reformed. 
2.2. FDI and trade 
This subsection concerns impacts of 
Eastern Enlargement on capital move-
ments and FDI to the CEECs from the 
                                                 
18 Weise 2002, pp. 13–15; Tables 3 and 4. 
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EU 15, especially Germany. It also cov-
ers developments in trade between Ger-
many and the CEECs and discusses re-
gional impacts of this on the German 
labour market. 
Capital movements and FDI 
Differences in factor endowments and 
factor prices in production will tend to 
intensify FDI from the EU 15 to the 
CEECs if there is Eastern Enlargement. 
FDI can be defined as a transfer 
of financial capital or capital in real 
terms to a foreign country intending, to 
influence business in the destination 
country. It can be subdivided into mar-
ket- oriented and cost-oriented FDI. 
With market-oriented FDI, production 
capacities are augmented by foreign ca-
pacities and positive effects on employ-
ment in the home country may evolve. 
With cost-oriented FDI, domestic pro-
duction capacities are replaced by for-
eign ones and negative employment ef-
fects in the home country may evolve, 
as the labour-intensive part of the value 
chain moves abroad. Rather than to cal-
culate any FDI potentials, this passage 
deals with the extent to which intensi-
fied German FDI in the CEECs will have 
effects on the German labour market. 
The CEECs took an average of 8.6 
per cent of the FDI of the EU 15 in the 
period 1992–6, with Germany (13 per 
cent) among the major contributors af-
ter Austria and Italy.19 A study by the 
IWH20 concludes that about 60 per 
cent of German FDI is market oriented 
and 40 per cent cost oriented. The cost-
oriented FDI comes mainly from proc-
essing industries, textiles, clothing and 
wood manufacturing. Of all German 
FDI in the 3 CEECs21 considered in the 
                                                 
19 Boeri and Brücker 2000, p. 66 (the 
‘EIC/DIW study’). 
20 Dey 2003, pp. 98–104. 
21 See List of Abbreviations. 
study, cost-oriented FDI make up about 
50 per cent. Empirical data in the study 
shows that this FDI is likely to have ef-
fects on the German labour market. 
Germany’s competitive chemical and 
automotive industries are expected to be 
the manufacturing and processing in-
dustries most affected. On the one 
hand, the authors point to negative ef-
fects on employment and wages in these 
industries, while emphasizing the 
chances for affected German companies 
to increase international competitiveness 
through efficiency gains from the inter-
national intra-industrial division of la-
bour.22 For it is mainly labour-intensive 
parts of the value chain that are moved 
to the CEECs, to improve the overall 
productivity of the home company.23 
Other studies reach similar conclu-
sions when analysing affected industries 
in the EU. Almost half the FDI in the 
CEECs is made in non-tradable goods 
for public utilities and the service sec-
tors. With highly labour-intensive trad-
able goods such as textiles and clothing, 
and to some extent electrical machinery 
and rubber and plastic products, motor 
vehicles and other transport equipment, 
the authors conclude that cost-oriented 
FDI takes a sizeable share. Low-skilled 
labour in these industries, in EU regions 
bordering the CEECs, is the only group 
to suffer from increasing EU FDI in the 
CEECs.24 
A study by the European Integration 
Consortium (EIC)25 also concludes that the 
rather small size of FDI projects in most in-
dustries is unlikely to apply any significant 
financial constraint on domestic investment. 
Crowding-out of investment in the EU by 
that in the CEECs is negligible.26 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Quaisser 2001A. 
24 Boeri and Brücker 2000, pp. 62–3. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 72. 
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2.3. Trade structure with CEECs 
and the impacts of Enlargement 
The opening of the CEECs to the West 
and gradual removals of trade barriers 
since 1990, following the conclusion of 
the Europe Agreements, have already 
had remarkable effects on trade by the 
EU 15 with the CEECs. EU exporters 
with a high R and D intensity, such as 
aircraft and computers, or a high level 
of product differentiation, such as ma-
chinery, have benefited from the re-
moval of tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
Meanwhile producers of labour-intensive 
goods such as textiles, footwear and 
leather products or of capital- and 
scale-intensive goods with a low level of 
technological sophistication (e.g. printing, 
chemicals, plastics and rubber products) 
have faced losses from increasing im-
port competition.27 
While intensifying trade with the 
CEECs has influenced EU industries very 
differently, according to their labour 
and capital intensities, these effects also 
vary geographically. Studies have found 
out that three-quarters of all EU trade 
with the CEECs is conducted by coun-
tries bordering them – Austria, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy and Finland – 
where the share of CEEC trade in total 
trade is considerably higher than in 
other EU member-states. However, esti-
mates based on gravity models that pro-
ject ‘normal’ patterns of bilateral trade, 
based on distance, GDP and population 
variables, show Austria, Germany and 
other countries bordering the CEECs had 
reached or surpassed the ‘normal’ vol-
ume of trade with the CEECs by 1997, 
while trade volume between the whole 
EU and the CEECs averaged only to 60 
per cent of the expected volume.28 
                                                 
27 Ibid., pp. 23–4. 
28 Ibid., pp. 33–4. 
Other studies, calculating ratios of ac-
tual to projected trade volumes of the 
EU 15 with the 10 CEECs find potentials 
being exploited in Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark, Austria, Greece and the Neth-
erlands, while Germany scores about 
average.29 
Nevertheless, all studies considered 
here mention unexploited trade poten-
tials for the CEECs and the whole EU 15 
and see these as potential sources for 
all sides of welfare gains from 
Enlargement. Let us look at the findings 
of some studies on Germany in particu-
lar and the various regional impacts on 
the German labour market. 
Germany’s trade with the 10 
CEECs in 1998 included USD 39.6 bil-
lion of exports (about 8.0 per cent of 
the country’s exports and 2.0 per cent 
of its GDP in that year), and USD 37.0 
billion of its imports (8.0 per cent of 
total imports and 1.7 per cent of 
GDP).30 
A study done for the EU in 1999 
by Keuschnigg and Kohler31 arrived at 
promising results for Germany in inten-
sifying its trade with the 5 CEECs.32 The 
authors argued that abolition of trade 
tariffs would increase imports and 
greatly increase exports (by 46.8 per 
cent) for Germany. Even exports to the 
EU 14 would rise by 0.677 per cent 
and to the rest of the world by 1.137 
per cent. This remarkable export boom 
was due to the fact that Germany 
needed to cut its average tariff to a 
lower rate (6.9 per cent) than the 
CEECs did (8.9 per cent), and because 
of considerable sectoral variation among 
Germany’s industries and those of the 
CEECs. Interestingly, the authors arrived 
at these results although the Europe 
Agreements had already removed most 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 106 and 109. 
30 Boeri and Brücker 2000, pp. 161–2. 
31 Keuschnigg et al., 1999 (‘the EU study’). 
32 See List of Abbreviations. 
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of the tariffs. They argued that the ef-
fects of complete single-market access 
for the CEECs, reflected in reductions of 
real trade costs, were much greater 
than those of the tariff cuts agreed in 
the Europe Agreements, since they were 
symmetrical for imports and exports. 
They predicted improving terms of trade 
for Germany (by 7.21 per cent) due to 
vanishing trade costs, compared to 
terms-of-trade shifts from tariff reduc-
tions, as direct equivalents of terms-of-
trade improvement.33  
The EIC/DIW study calculates the 
effects of increasing trade activities on 
wage levels and employment rates in 
different sectors and on employees with 
different levels of skills in Western 
Germany. Theoretically, an increase in 
domestic demand and in the foreign 
component of demand has a positive 
impact on wages, while an increase in 
the import share of the domestic market 
of an industry reduces wages in that 
industry. But the results for both com-
ponents of foreign supply and demand 
turn out to be insignificant for Ger-
many, because the trade effects are 
generally too small to make a nation-
wide impact on relative wages likely. 34 
Since most German industries’ shares of 
exports to the CEECs in domestic pro-
duction and imports from the CEECs in 
domestic sales are rather small, the im-
pacts of increasing trade with the CEECs 
will not be felt. Germany’s trade with 
the CEECs has a considerable impact 
only in two industries: in textiles, the 
share of exports to the CEECs in do-
mestic production increased by 9.5 per 
cent between 1990 and 1995 and the 
share of imports from the CEECs in 
domestic sales of clothing increased by 
6.8 per cent. In all other industries, the 
increased were less than 3.0 per cent. 
The authors calculate that increasing 
trade activities with the CEECs pushed 
                                                 
33 Ibid., pp. 11–13. 
34 Boeri and Brücker 2000, pp. 76–7. 
up wages in textiles by 0.6 per cent 
and lowered them in clothing by 0.02 
per cent. The same holds true for la-
bour mobility and employment: the in-
crease in demand from the CEECs re-
duced the individual probability of 
becoming unemployed in textiles by 0.4 
per cent, while in clothing it increased 
by 0.4 per cent. It is interesting to note 
that the increase in net exports in tex-
tiles corresponds to an increase in net 
imports in clothing. So if there are any 
notable effects on the German labour 
market of the increasing trade due to 
Enlargement, they are to the detriment 
of low-skilled employees in labour-
intensive industries, such as clothing, 
while highly skilled labour in high-
technology industries may benefit.35 
A report prepared by the OIM36 
also concludes that Germany’s trade 
with the CEECs is too small for Eastern 
Enlargement to pose a noticeable threat 
to wages or employment in Germany. 
Only for clothing and metals is a corre-
lation between increasing CEECs’ market 
shares and decreasing employment fea-
sible. The author emphasizes that Ger-
many’s trade volumes are already as 
high as they are expected to become, 
since most trade activities have already 
been liberalized. Even for sensitive in-
dustries like textiles, steel and chemicals, 
no marked increase in imports is ex-
pected, although agriculture is an ex-
ception.37 In a report by Dicke and 
Foders,38 the authors also argue that the 
association agreements have removed 
most of the trade barriers and given a 
boost to Germany’s trade with the 
CEECs, so that they do not expect any 
further increase in German exports to 
result from Eastern Enlargement. 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 74 and pp. 78–83. 
36 Quaisser 2001A (‘the OIM report’). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Dicke and Foders 2000, p. 157. 
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2.4. Growth and welfare 
This section looks at macroeconomic ef-
fects of Enlargement and analyses their 
impact on growth and welfare in Ger-
many. Section 2.3 mentioned the export 
boom, with a 46.8 per cent increase in 
Germany’s exports to the CEECs forecast 
in the third scenario of an EU Enlarge-
ment by 5 CEECs, presented in the EU 
study. With this scenario, the export 
boom increases domestic producer 
prices by 0.074 per cent on average, 
while intermediate prices fall by 0.135 
per cent and investment prices by 0.085 
per cent. As a result, Germany’s terms 
of trade with the 5 CEECs improve by 
7.210 per cent and investment mounts 
by 0.557 per cent of the long-term 
capital stock. Although Germany’s terms 
of trade with the EU 14 ease by 0.053 
per cent and with the rest of the world 
by 0.044 per cent, the economy experi-
ences an investment and export-led ex-
pansion, with capital stocks increasing 
by 0.557 per cent. The output expan-
sion of 0.550 per cent mainly comes 
through market entry and contributes to 
productivity gains due to increasing 
specialization and diversification of in-
dustrial production. Furthermore, overall 
consumption is up 0.741 per cent, while 
disposable wage incomes increase by 
0.498 per cent and consumer prices fall 
by 0.241 per cent. Wage rates increase 
slightly more for the highly skilled 
(0.576 per cent) than for the low-skilled 
(0.560 per cent), although the highly 
skilled labour supply increases by 0.035 
per cent and the low-skilled labour 
supply by 0.031 per cent. All in all, the 
study forecasts GDP growth of 0.449 
per cent for Germany due to a 5 
CEECs Enlargement, and an additional 
welfare gain of 0.375 per cent of GDP, 
while net foreign debt rises by 0.101 
per cent.39 
The WIFO study40 forecasts GDP 
growth rates from Eastern Enlargement 
by 3 CEECs.41 But the author mentions 
that the 3 CEECs cover about two-thirds 
of the 10 CEECs’ GDP, so that the mac-
roeconomic effects of a 10 CEECs 
Enlargement would be about a third 
higher. On average, for 2005 and 
2006, it foresees 0.63 per cent annual 
GDP growth for Germany from 3 CEECs 
Enlargement, followed by 0.48 per cent 
on average in 2008–10 of 0.48 per 
cent, whereas the EU 13 averages would 
be 0.42 per cent and 0.26 per cent, 
respectively. The growth results from (1) 
trade effects – tariff reductions – bring-
ing 0.15 per cent of the 2005–6 GDP 
growth (0.01 per cent for 2008–10), (2) 
single-market effects – an efficiency in-
crease42 and a fall in consumer prices – 
bringing 0.50 per cent (0.37 per cent), 
(3) FDI flows to the CEECs bringing -
0.07 per cent (-0.12 per cent), (4) and 
migration to the EU bringing 0.6 per 
cent (0.23 per cent). The fiscal costs of 
such an Enlargement would be -0.01 
per cent (-0.01 per cent).43 The study 
goes on to calculate detailed macroeco-
nomic effects for Germany. GDP growth 
in real terms is accompanied by an in-
crease in real personal disposable in-
comes of 0.73 per cent in 2005–6 and 
0.76 per cent in 2008–10. Consumer 
prices fall by 0.42 per cent (0.43 per 
cent). Employment is up 0.09 per cent 
(0.47 per cent), while the unemployment 
rate increases in the short run by 0.11 
percentage points (-0.21 percentage 
points). This is all accompanied by a 
0.04 per cent (0.24 per cent) increase 
in the current-account balance and a 
                                                 
39 Keuschnigg 1999, pp. 11–13; Table 4. 
40 Breuss 2001. 
41 See List of Abbreviations. 
42 From economies of scale. 
43 Ibid., p. 21; Table 5. 
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budget balance increment of 0.11 per 
cent (0.29 per cent) of GDP.44 
Lejour et al., in their study, do 
not expect much from the removal of 
tariffs either. They calculate that if the 
CEECs remove them and adopt common 
external tariffs (CET), it will change 
GDP, volume of consumption, and the 
terms of trade by negligible amounts, 
whereas accession to the internal market 
adds 0.1 per cent to GDP growth, 0.4 
per cent to the volume of consumption, 
and 1.2 per cent to the terms of 
trade.45 
2.5. Industry-specific effects – 
agriculture as a sensitive sector  
As mentioned before, the patterns of 
inter-industrial trade show high, but de-
clining revealed comparative advantages 
for the EU over the CEECs in industries 
with high R and D intensity (e.g. phar-
maceuticals and computers) and high 
product differentiation (e.g. measuring 
instruments and machinery). Low and 
decreasing comparative advantages oc-
cur in scale and capital-intensive indus-
tries (e.g. chemicals, rubber and plastic, 
and motor vehicles) and in those with 
high technological levels. Comparative 
advantages for the EU in industries with 
high wage levels are considerable, but 
they have been declining since initial 
adjustment in the years of transition. 
Observed comparative advantages of the 
EU in food and agriculture depend on 
a high level of policy intervention (sub-
sidies, trade protection) rather than 
‘true’ comparative advantages. But high 
if decreasing levels of revealed com-
parative advantage for the CEECs can 
be seen in natural resources and re-
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 22; Table 5. 
45 Lejour et al. (2001), p. 10, pp. 15–17 and p. 
21. 
source-intensive industries, and in trade 
in commodities of a low technological 
standard. The CEECs have high and ris-
ing levels of revealed comparative ad-
vantage in labour-intensive goods (e.g. 
clothing, footwear and textiles), ‘sensi-
tive’ industries (showing a high level of 
tariff and non-tariff protection from the 
EU), such as shipbuilding, basic iron 
and steel, and to a lesser extent in tex-
tiles, clothing and footwear.46 Only in 
clothing, footwear and textiles, where 
imports from the CEECs have gained 
notable market shares in Germany (8.5 
per cent), and for exports, in communi-
cation equipment, measuring instru-
ments, computers and motor vehicles, is 
a notable effect on relative prices fore-
seen. Significant wage and employment 
effects of trade are expected to be lim-
ited to these industries as well.47 
The EU study calculates detailed 
effects on supply and demand in vari-
ous German industries.48 It concludes 
that agriculture, textiles, clothing and 
chemicals are the industries affected 
most in Germany, and food and metal-
processing industries to a lesser extent. 
Food industries face by far the greatest 
change in EU external protection – a 
22.0 per cent cut in external EU tariffs 
plus a 5.6 per cent decline in real 
trade costs with the CEECs – and show 
an above-average trade elasticity (3.5), 
which generates an import boom of 
Eastern food products (+243.0 per 
cent). With noticeably falling domestic 
prices (-0.43 per cent), the food indus-
tries take advantage of new export op-
portunities to CEECs markets, which 
prevents contraction relative to agricul-
ture. The export boom in textiles and 
clothing (+137.7 per cent), on the other 
hand, is due to increasing demand 
(+179.2 per cent) from the CEECs in-
duced by lower producer prices (-0.63 
                                                 
46 Boeri and Brücker 2000, pp. 40–42. 
47 Ibid., p. 47. 
48 See Table 6. 
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per cent). But these industries experi-
ence the biggest loss in domestic de-
mand (-4.90 per cent), as quite a high 
rate of EU tariff protection is removed 
(-11.0 per cent) and real trade costs fall 
by 9.2 per cent. Yet, textiles and cloth-
ing expand output strongly by 2.18 per 
cent, due to a high initial share of ex-
ports to the CEECs. A similar, less pro-
nounced development occurs in chemi-
cals. Output is up 2.6 per cent and 
exports to CEECs are up 41.6 per cent. 
In metal processing, output is up 1.4 
per cent and exports to the CEECs up 
45.9 per cent. Demand for highly 
skilled and low-skilled labour increases 
most in chemicals (+1.76 per cent and 
+1.78 per cent), textiles and clothing 
(+0.96 per cent and +0.97 per cent) 
and metal processing (+0.86 per cent 
and +0.87 per cent), while it decreases 
in the food industries (-0.81 per cent 
and -0.80 per cent).49 
The EU study expects agriculture 
in Germany to be the sector most af-
fected by Eastern Enlargement, as it has 
the highest tariff and non-tariff protec-
tion. As soon as CAP applies to the 
CEECs, expansion of low-cost farm out-
put in the CEECs is expected to depress 
world-market prices by about 2.0 per 
cent and German imports from the 
CEECs will in increase in the long run 
by 133.1 per cent. For the same reason, 
the increase in home prices relative to 
world-market prices reduces German 
domestic demand (-3.5 per cent) and 
agricultural exports (-8.1 per cent), ex-
cept exports to the CEECs (+20.6 per 
cent), which benefit from falling real 
trade costs (-4.6 per cent). Moreover, 
as intermediate goods account for a low 
share of agricultural costs, the sector 
benefits less than others from lower im-
port prices and is more affected by ris-
ing factor costs. Thus the demand shock 
in agriculture mainly turns into an out-
put contraction of 3.1 per cent and 
                                                 
49 Ibid., pp. 16–18; Table 6. 
demand for highly skilled and for low-
skilled labour falls by 3.6 per cent.50 
The OIM report also points to a 
notable boost in agricultural production 
in the CEECs, which extend the arable 
land in the EU by 55 per cent. This 
brings additional oversupply onto the 
German agricultural market, which has 
notable surpluses already. On the one 
hand, it concludes that Germany’s agri-
culture may be among the losers by 
Eastern Enlargement. It expects price 
reductions for German beef and cereals, 
increasing competition from the CEECs 
for cattle and calf breeding, and 
mounting competition for regions bor-
dering the CEECs. On the other hand, 
agricultural prices have been rising in 
recent years in the CEECs due to inter-
vention and increasing costs, so that 
price differentials between the EU 15 
and the CEECs are shrinking, due to 
CAP reforms and increasing costs in the 
CEECs from higher quality and ecologi-
cal standards.51 
2.6. Migration as a major         
impact 
The migration associated with economic 
integration has impacts on the German 
economy. First, results from a calcula-
tion of migration potential are pre-
sented, in which impacts on the German 
labour market and the welfare system 
are discussed. One major finding is that 
the degree of effect depends largely on 
the skill types of labour that migrate 
and the regions in which they settle.52 
                                                 
50 Keuschnigg 1999, pp. 16–18; Table 6. 
51 Quaisser 2001A. 
52 For more detailed analysis of the first Eastern 
Enlargement, see this author’s forthcoming paper 
‘Migration potentials following the first EU East-
ern Enlargement – impacts on Germany’s labour 
market and the social welfare system’. 
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An econometric model of migration 
potential for Germany 
This subsection presents the results of 
an econometric model of the migration 
potential to Germany generated by East-
ern Enlargement, calculated from the 
DIW and the EIC in 2000. The model 
has been chosen because its assumptions 
seem closest to reality and the results 
fall around the average of all the calcu-
lations. 
This EIC/DIW study explicitly con-
siders how propensity to migrate is dis-
tributed unevenly, so that country-
specific shares of the population do so, 
given the presence of income differen-
tials. Once that segment has moved, net 
migration declines to zero, leaving fu-
ture immigration as a function of in-
come differentials (GDP per capita at 
PPP), employment prospects (highly de-
pendent on unemployment rates), indi-
vidual factors  (a country-specific 
dummy variable), the stock of earlier 
immigrants in the destination country, 
and institutional factors.53 The study 
performs econometric analysis of migra-
tion potentials from the 10a CEECs, cal-
culating long-term equilibrium for stocks 
of immigrants to Germany, using his-
torical data for migration in 1967–98 to 
Germany, from the EU 15, Norway, 
Switzerland, former Yugoslavia, Turkey 
and the United States. The authors give 
several reasons why the results of past 
migration movements from the 18 coun-
tries considered can, to a limited extent, 
project migration potentials from the 
10a CEECs to Germany in the 21st cen-
tury. They argue that most past migra-
tion happened in times of economic 
growth and near-zero unemployment. 
Although income differentials between 
Germany and the CEECs are much 
                                                 
53 Brücker 2000. E.g. the degree to which mi-
gration of labour is institutionally limited – this 
study assumes unlimited movement of labour 
from the year 2002 onwards in all its three 
scenarios. 
greater than they were with the 18 
countries in the study, geographical dis-
tances are much smaller. So the data 
input can give an indication of the mi-
gration effects of Eastern Enlargement, 
but not an accurate prognosis. The 
study takes three scenarios for the de-
velopment of income differentials, but 
this paper keeps to the baseline scenario 
findings. Results are average numbers 
that can vary widely with business cy-
cles.54 
In the baseline scenario, GDP per 
capita in Germany grows at an annual 
average of 2 per cent and in the 10a-
CEECs at 4 per cent, cutting income 
differentials by 50 per cent in the next 
35 years,55 with unemployment rates 
stable at the 1988 rate for Germany 
and the 1998 rate for the 10a CEECs. 
The outcome of this scenario shows an 
annual increase in the number of resi-
dents from the 10a CEECs in Germany 
of about 218,000 in 2002, declining to 
increases of 162,000 in 2005, 95,600 
in 2010, 27,500 in 2020 and 1,500 in 
2030. To sum up, there will be an in-
crease of about 2,000,000 residents 
from the 10a CEECs in Germany in the 
period 2002–30, of whom 1,355,000 
are expected to arrive by 2010. Adding 
the stock of past immigrants, there will 
be around 2,500,000 residents from the 
10a-CEECs in Germany by the year of 
2030, making up 3.5 per cent of Ger-
many’s population. Extrapolating these 
results onto the EU 15 shows that about 
3,000,000 migrants to the EU 15 can 
be expected up to 2030, a potential 
migration of which Germany receives 
two-thirds. The authors conclude that 
migration to Germany will increase as a 
result of Eastern Enlargement, but it 
will be spread over a long period and 
fall to almost zero by 2030, when long-
                                                 
54 Ibid.; Table 8. 
55 That makes a convergence rate of 2 per cent 
a year for income differentials. 
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term equilibrium for the migration stock 
is reached.56 
There remain three aspects of re-
cent events that may change these pre-
dictions radically. (1) The unlimited 
movement of labour assumed in the 
EIC/DIW-study is not realistic, since the 
Copenhagen Summit of the EU Council 
in 2002 proposed a period of limita-
tions on free movement of up to seven 
years,57 interestingly, after strong pres-
sure from Germany. (2) The first EU 
Eastern Enlargement actually took place 
on May 1, 2004, not 2002 as the study 
assumes. These two changes may have a 
notable impact on the calculation, or 
they may just postpone the migration 
potentials. (3) It was Malta and Cyprus, 
not Romania and Bulgaria, that joined 
the first round, which certainly reduces 
the migration potential, of which Roma-
nia had been expected to account for 
605,000 (30 per cent).58 
The impacts of migration on Ger-
many’s labour market 
Immigration of foreign labour does not 
necessarily have a detrimental effect on 
domestic workers. Economic theories 
suggest that in open economies, the ef-
fects of migration on wages and em-
ployment can be neutral, but they can 
also affect inter-industrial wage differen-
tials and displacement risks. The wage 
and employment effects of migration 
may not be spread evenly among work-
ers. Those who have human-capital en-
dowments for which immigrants may 
act as a substitute will lose, while those 
with complementary human-capital en-
dowments may benefit. Furthermore, the 
results depend to a remarkable extent 
                                                 
56 Brücker 2000; Table 8. 
57 This was also the case after the Southern 
Enlargement in 1986. 
58 Ibid.; Boeri and Brücker 2000, pp. 121–4; 
Table 8. 
on the skill structure of the immigrants. 
This subsection considers the results of 
several studies on the impacts of immi-
gration on the German labour market. 
They all suggest that the results depend 
on the qualifications of the immigrants 
and the flexibility of the labour market, 
so that they may be far less threatening 
than has been predicted in public dis-
cussion. 
According to the results of the IFO 
study,59 the inflexibility of the German 
labour market will mean that an addi-
tional supply of labour, at least in the 
short term, will increase unemployment 
rather than decreasing wage levels. The 
study also reaches six other conclusions. 
1) The qualification structure of the 
immigrants from the CEECs will continue 
to lean towards workers with higher 
skills than those of other immigrants. 2) 
Increasing immigration from the CEECs 
will put pressure on wages in some 
parts of the German labour market, 
especially on low-skilled jobs in produc-
tion industries. Impacts on the general 
wage level may be positive, but a wider 
wage structure may be detrimental to 
income allocation in Germany. Pressure 
on wage levels is expected to develop in 
industries where domestic workers are 
substitutive, rather than complementary 
to immigrant workers. The authors ex-
pect such crowding-out effects for low-
skilled workers in Germany’s manufac-
turing and construction industries. For 
low-skilled workers in services, the au-
thors foresee minor crowding-out ef-
fects, as relations of domestic to immi-
grant workers are more complementary 
there. The results show that in general, 
the impacts on wage levels and em-
ployment depend strongly on immi-
grants’ level of skills. Incomes of low-
skilled workers decrease and incomes of 
highly skilled workers increase slightly if 
immigrants are mainly low-skilled work-
ers, whereas incomes of highly skilled 
                                                 
59 Sinn 2000. 
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workers decrease slightly and incomes 
of low-skilled workers increase if most 
immigrants are highly skilled. In the 
past, relatively highly skilled immigrants 
from the CEECs have mainly been em-
ployed in relatively low-skilled jobs. If 
they can manage to find employment in 
jobs that match their skills, they may 
reduce the peak levels of wages in 
highly skilled jobs, in IT, for instance. 
3) Immigration from the CEECs intensi-
fies expansion of the service sectors in 
Germany, as more and more immigrants 
are employed in the service sectors, 
which increases growth and employment 
rates in the long term by raising alloca-
tion efficiency and consumption. 4) In 
the long term, the jobs of immigrants 
will adjust to their skill levels, whereas 
in the short term, highly skilled and 
low-skilled immigrants compete for the 
same jobs. 5) Immigration of cross-
border commuters implies long-term 
chances, but also risks for the labour 
markets of regions directly bordering 
the CEECs. 6) Commuters from the 
CEECs can function as a reserve and 
buffer for the German labour market, 
which may in the long term be bur-
dened by an ageing society and there-
fore happy to welcome young workers 
from the CEECs.60 
The OIM study61 also emphasizes 
the relevance of the relation between 
domestic and immigrant workers, with 
immigration of substituting workers de-
creasing domestic wage levels and im-
migration of complementary workers 
rather increasing them. The study also 
highlights the importance of the skill 
levels of immigrants and draws the 
same conclusions as the IFO study on 
domestic wage levels. The authors men-
tion a study on Germany that shows the 
results of a 1 per cent increase of em-
ployment by general immigrants causing 
domestic wages of all workers to de-
                                                 
60 Ibid., pp. 108–19. 
61 Dietz et al. 2000. 
cline by 0.35 per cent, with a 0.45 per 
cent decline for low-skilled wages and a 
0.12 per cent increase for highly skilled. 
They mention another study that models 
a 1 per cent increase of domestic la-
bour by low-skilled immigrants, with 
stable unemployment rates resulting in a 
3.1 per cent decline of low-skilled wages 
and a 0.5 per cent increase of highly 
skilled wages. However, if immigrants 
are mainly highly skilled workers, the 
wages of low-skilled workers are up by 
0.8 per cent, whereas the wages of 
highly skilled workers are down 0.5 per 
cent. As far as unemployment is con-
cerned, the authors emphasize that 
studies have not found any remarkable 
impacts of immigration on unemploy-
ment in the destination country, al-
though there is a slight tendency to in-
crease unemployment among low-skilled 
workers.62 
The EIC/DIW-study also mentions 
substitution and the complementary as-
pect of highly skilled and low-skilled 
workers, and the relevance of rigidity 
of domestic wages. The authors build 
up two scenarios. In the first, it is pre-
sumed that immigrants are all low-
skilled workers. If wages are flexible, 
they decrease so much that immigration 
equivalent to 1 per cent of the popula-
tion keeps incomes and the unemploy-
ment rate of low-skilled workers stable, 
whereas if wages are rigid – if domes-
tic workers are substitutive by immi-
grants – incomes of domestic workers 
decrease by 0.65 per cent. Furthermore, 
immigration may have a huge impact 
on income allocation. If immigration of 
highly skilled workers makes wages de-
cline while unemployment rates remain 
constant, incomes of low-skilled workers 
decrease by 3.1 per cent and incomes 
of highly skilled workers increase by 0.5 
per cent. In the second scenario, all 
immigrants are highly skilled workers. 
The complementary relation between 
                                                 
62 Ibid., pp. 45–6. 
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highly skilled and low-skilled workers, 
in this case, makes demand for low-
skilled workers increase. The develop-
ment of wage levels still depends on the 
degree of rigidity. Thus immigration of 
highly skilled workers can increase in-
comes of low-skilled workers, but with 
concurrent allocation effects. If wages 
are flexible, incomes of low-skilled 
workers will increase by 0.8 per cent, 
whereas those of highly skilled workers 
will decrease by 0.5 per cent, leaving 
unemployment rates stable. However, if 
wages are rigid, unemployment of low-
skilled workers will be sharply reduced 
and incomes of domestic workers in-
crease by 1.38 per cent, in the case of 
immigration equivalent to 1 per cent of 
the population.  
The IZA study refers to the 
EIC/DIW study and concludes that im-
migration into Germany after Eastern 
Enlargement by 10 CEECs will have 
modest general effects on the German 
labour markets. Furthermore, immigra-
tion of highly skilled workers may even 
bring growth effects in Germany and 
impacts of low-skilled workers migrating 
to Germany will be bearable, but the 
exact skill structure of the potential 
immigrants cannot be foreseen.63 
These results underline my conclu-
sion that impacts of immigration are 
differently allocated among highly skilled 
and low-skilled workers. Since the pre-
cise structure of potential migrants of 
an EU Eastern Enlargement coming to 
Germany cannot be known in advance, 
the exact allocation of benefits and 
losses among domestic workers is not 
sure yet. But, it should be emphasized 
that overall impacts on the German la-
bour market are commonly regarded as 
moderate. The next section analyzes if 
this also holds true for the social wel-
fare system. 
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Impacts of migration on Germany’s 
welfare system 
This subsection discusses whether addi-
tional immigrants expected in Germany 
after Eastern Enlargement will negatively 
affect Germany’s welfare system as net 
beneficiaries of it, which would generate 
additional artificial migration incentives. 
The study by Krieger and Sauer 
(2003) exclusively considers impacts on 
Germany’s pension system, which they 
expect to be more or less negligible, 
but positive. They emphasize that poten-
tial migrants to Germany are expected 
to be relatively young, so that they will 
contribute to the German pension system 
rather than benefit from it, even in the 
long term, provided the migration po-
tential turns out to be around the esti-
mated 130,000–300,000 a year for the 
first 15 years.64 The study further ex-
pects Germany’s public pension spending 
as a proportion of GDP to increase 
from 11.8 per cent in 2000 to 16.9 per 
cent in 2050, calculated on a baseline 
of 300,000 net immigrants a year in 
2000 declining to 20,000 in 2050. The 
authors find out that a 50 per cent in-
crease in the number of immigrants 
lowers pension spending by only 1 per 
cent. So the authors conclude that even 
massive immigration to Germany after 
Eastern Enlargement will only have slight 
effects on the pension system.65 
The IFO study analyses impacts on 
the whole social welfare system in each 
of the social security funds. It finds that 
immigrants on average contribute 5 per 
cent less to the public health-insurance 
system than Germans do. To the public 
nursing-care insurance system, however, 
foreigners in 1997 contributed EUR 1 
billion66 more than they received. Even 
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65 Ibid., p. 25. 
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when taking into account that they built 
up claims on future benefits from the 
funds, the study concludes that foreign-
ers are net contributors to the public 
nursing care-insurance system, contrib-
uting more to it than Germans do. To 
the public pension system, foreigners are 
generally net contributors on the basis 
of current payments,67 whereas Germans 
are not. With public unemployment in-
surance, immigrants receive more bene-
fits than they contribute, with those 
staying less than 24 years in Germany 
contributing, but those staying longer 
than 25 years benefiting to a greater 
extent. The situation looks different with 
public payments from the social security 
funds. Just 1.3 per cent of all Germans 
receive social-security payments, while 
3.1 per cent of all foreigners do. Finally, 
the study calculates a balance for all 
public funds and concludes that for-
eigners in 1997 were net recipients 
from the German social welfare system, 
by a so-called migration premium 
amounting to EUR 700 per capita. This 
becomes EUR 2300 for those in their 
first ten years and EUR 850 EUR68 for 
those who have been in Germany for 
longer than 25 years. The authors ar-
gue that immigrants have low average 
skills or find employment in the short 
term in jobs demanding a lower level of 
skills than they possess, so that their 
wage incomes and thus their contribu-
tions to the welfare system are relatively 
low compared to social benefits they 
receive. 69 
In another IFO report,70 the au-
thors use the finding that immigrants 
into Germany are net recipients of the 
welfare system to argue for artificial 
migration incentives, especially among 
low-skilled workers and thereby in the 
                                                 
67 I.e. if they do not stay longer than 25 years. 
68 See Note 66.  
69 Sinn et al. 2000, p. 190. 
70 Sinn and Werding 2001, pp. 44–5, and Sinn 
2002, pp. 107–9. 
short run an enlarged migration poten-
tial for Germany. The resulting fiscal 
burden, the authors argue, might en-
courage the destination country to re-
duce benefits from the welfare system, 
resulting in competitive erosion of EU 
welfare systems. 
3) NET WINNERS AND LOSERS 
IN GERMANY 
Without drawing conclusions yet, simply 
to evaluate the various impacts men-
tioned so far and reveal their relative 
weights, let me sum up some of the 
findings on Enlargement’s net effect on 
Germany. It is then possible to identify 
the winners and losers in general and 
mention specific impacts of the reor-
ganization of the EU structural policies 
on certain crucial regions bordering the 
CEECs. 
3.1. Evaluation of the effects 
The EIC/DIW-study analyses whether the 
integration effects of Enlargement with 
the 10 CEECs are large enough to mat-
ter in Germany. The authors point out 
that size is critical. Integration of the 
CEECs has no impact on wages and 
employment if external non-EU countries 
remain marginal suppliers in certain 
markets. In that case, increasing exports 
of labour-intensive goods from the 
CEECs to the EU partially redirect trade 
from external countries, but leave 
product prices unchanged. If the CEECs 
are large enough to redirect EU imports 
completely away from external coun-
tries, they become marginal suppliers to 
the EU and the protective effect of EU 
tariffs is at least partly removed. This is 
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likely to apply to labour-intensive goods 
with high transport costs. In most sec-
tors, the import shares of the CEECs are 
too small to cause a complete redirec-
tion of trade flows. Only in clothing, 
footwear and textiles industries do their 
imports achieve notable market shares 
in Germany (8.5 per cent), which means 
that significant price shifts can be ex-
pected in some products of these indus-
tries. The shares of EU exports taken by 
the CEECs are notable in communication 
equipment, measuring instruments, com-
puters and motor vehicles. If significant 
impacts on wages and employment by 
trade occur at all, the authors expect 
them to be limited to these industries. 
Although there are effects on low-skilled 
labour to be expected in regions di-
rectly bordering the CEECs, they will not 
be large enough to affect the marginal 
supply of low-skilled labour to a notice-
able extent. The study concludes that 
the differences in factor endowments, as 
far as trade and FDI are concerned, 
are too small to affect marginal de-
mand and supply significantly. This 
means that national wage levels and 
employment in Germany will be hardly 
affected by Enlargement by the 10-
CEECs. But the authors stress that in-
creasing division of labour – technologi-
cal and human resource-intensive pro-
duction in the EU 15 and more labour-
intensive production in the CEECs – may 
have a strong impact on relative wage 
levels and employment in regions di-
rectly bordering the CEECs.71 
The EU study72 concludes that 
Eastern Enlargement, despite widespread 
concerns, is clearly beneficial to the 
German economy in overall welfare 
terms. The authors mention the concerns 
of low-skilled workers about possible 
increasing competition from CEECs bi-
ased towards labour-intensive produc-
tion. These weigh particularly heavy in 
                                                 
71 Boeri and Brücker 2000, pp. 46–8. 
72 Keuschnigg 1999. 
political discourse in Germany. Because 
of geographical location and historic 
developments, the authors argue, trade 
shares of the CEECs are more pro-
nounced in Germany than in the EU 
average. So Germany is more exposed 
to the opportunities as well as the risks 
of Enlargement. Despite challenges for 
the agricultural sector, Enlargement of-
fers huge potential for investment-led 
expansion of the German economy. 
These expansionary effects enlarge the 
tax base, generating a fiscal dividend 
on a scale that broadly compensates 
Germany for the fiscal costs of 
Enlargement and contributes to better 
fiscal balance of payments in the long 
term. The study calculates an increase 
of 0.52 per cent in public transfers to 
households with no change in public 
debt. Integration will benefit capital-
intensive and labour-intensive industries. 
As a result, Enlargement will not sig-
nificantly affect the wage gap between 
highly skilled and low-skilled labour. 
The authors conclude that Eastern 
Enlargement may be broadly self-
financing and promises considerable 
welfare gains for present member-
states.73 
In another OIM report,74 the au-
thors foresee that Germany will be 
among the net winners by Eastern 
Enlargement. The results of several stud-
ies cited put Germany in the winning 
group along with Italy and Austria, if 
not in the top beneficiary position. But 
the report also mentions some facts that 
are uncertain today and are maybe not 
considered well enough by the EU mem-
ber-states. The author is afraid that the 
long-term fiscal costs of Enlargement for 
net contributors to the EU budget might 
be underestimated. Furthermore, he 
expects that positive effects of migration 
on the EU 15 economies may not 
                                                 
73 Keuschnigg 1999, 1 (executive summary) and 
pp. 25–6. 
74 Quaisser and Hall 2002. 
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materialize, since Western European la-
bour markets, especially the German 
one, are marked by restrictions and in-
flexibility.75 
 
3.2. Winners and losers 
Although Germany is expected to be the 
biggest winner by Eastern Enlargement, 
the benefits will differ widely between 
regions and sectors. There are even re-
markable losses expected, especially for 
low-skilled labour in certain labour-
intensive industries, in regions directly 
bordering the CEECs. Most of the find-
ings shown here have been discussed in 
various sections before. They are merely 
summarized here to reveal the main 
winners and losers by Eastern Enlarge-
ment. 
The findings of the EU study fur-
ther extend findings on various groups 
in Germany likely to be most affected 
by Enlargement and thereby to benefit 
or lose from it to a noticeable extent. 
Benefits for owners of capital, generally 
from enhanced profits and equity val-
ues, will appear quite soon, while bene-
fits for workers will take effect only 
after some time, along with capital ac-
cumulation. But windfall gains and 
losses to owners of capital will be dis-
tributed quite unevenly among indus-
tries. Agriculture and food processing 
are expected to be among the losers, as 
subsidies from CAP will be extended to 
the CEECs and thereby redistributed, 
while chemicals, metal processing, tex-
tiles and clothing industries may benefit, 
as shown in more detail in Section 
2.5.76 
                                                 
75 Ibid., pp. 23–4. 
76 Keuschnigg 1999, 1. 
The author of an FES report ex-
pects low-skilled workers in construc-
tion, restaurants and agriculture, espe-
cially in border regions, to be among 
the losers by Enlargement, but foresees 
exporters, importers and capital-owning 
investors benefiting from reduced risks, 
common regulations and standards, and 
reduced distortion of competition, after 
the adoption of EU law in the CEECs.77 
The OIM report78 expects the 
German agricultural sector especially to 
be among the losers by Eastern 
Enlargement. Cattle and calf breeding in 
regions bordering the CEECs might suf-
fer increasing competition. Domestic 
price reductions for German beef and 
cereals are expected. However, positive 
effects on employment are expected in 
export-oriented industries, although they 
will be rather moderate. The authors 
emphasize that generally high positive 
potentials from Enlargement could com-
pensate for negative ones, so long as 
Germany is well prepared for it. Prob-
lems of structural and institutional defi-
cits on the German labour market are 
mentioned, these being due not to im-
pacts of Enlargement, but requiring ex-
tensive reforms and structural adjust-
ment processes in general.79 
A study by the IFO for the Bavar-
ian Ministry of the Economy80 concludes 
that Enlargement will result in only 
moderate welfare gains for the EU 15, 
and that these benefits will be widely 
spread among regions and industries. 
Furthermore, gains will be higher in re-
gions and industries that have intensified 
trade activities with the CEECs. So Ger-
many, and especially Bavaria, will be 
the most affected by Enlargement. The 
authors mention studies that calculate a 
long-term 0.5 per cent increase in Ba-
                                                 
77 Dauderstädt 2002. 
78 Quaisser 2001A. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Alecke et al. 2001, pp. 94–127. 
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varia’s share of GDP.81 Labour-intensive 
industries in Eastern Bavaria, directly 
bordering the CEECs,82 such as con-
struction and processing industries, will 
certainly face increasing competition 
from labour migrating from the CEECs 
and for reasons of income differentials, 
most probably belong to the group of 
losers by Eastern Enlargement. The  
study points out that the degree of 
competitiveness of Bavarian regions de-
termines which will benefit and which 
lose by Enlargement.83 Theories differen-
tiate between sectoral and regional 
competitiveness. The former covers the 
competitiveness of a region’s sectoral 
structure and the latter analyses the ex-
tent to which factors are responsible for 
economic growth in a region in the 
long term. With the sectoral structure, 
it turns out that 45 regions out of 96 
have a structure superior to the Ger-
man average and 51 have one inferior. 
The regions along the Czech border de-
cidedly belong to the ones with an infe-
rior, less growth-oriented sectoral struc-
ture. Regions with less growth potential 
in Bavaria will especially face adjust-
ment pressure from Enlargement. How-
ever, analyzing regional competitiveness, 
the study shows a correlation with fac-
tors of potential growth in Bavaria’s 
regions. Growth is positively correlated 
with industrial investments, foreign 
turnover, highly skilled workers, patent 
intensity and a developed infrastructure, 
and negatively correlated with degree of 
initial productivity. The authors conclude 
that Bavaria’s border regions are poorly 
endowed with these factors and will 
therefore encounter adjustment pressure 
from Enlargement.84 Similar develop-
ments are expected in federal states of 
                                                 
81 Ibid., p. 236. 
82 I.e. Oberfranken-Ost, Oberpfalz-Nord, Re-
gensburg, Donau-Wald, Landshut and Südost-
bayern. 
83 Ibid., pp. 94-127. 
84 Ibid. 
Eastern Germany, especially those di-
rectly bordering the CEECs: Mecklen-
burg-Hither Pomerania, Brandenburg 
and Saxony. For these, there may be an 
additional burden from redistribution of 
EU structural policy funds, as explained 
in the next subsection. 
3.4. Reorganization of EU struc-
tural policies and impacts on 
crucial border regions 
Figures from the EIC/DIW study point 
out that the shares of trade with the 
CEECs are aspects of Germany’s trade 
volume that differ strongly between fed-
eral states. With the old federal states 
in Western Germany, the CEECs had an 
average share of 6.25 per cent of all 
trade in 1997, but the average among 
the new federal states in Eastern Ger-
many is 14.35 per cent, with peaks in 
Saxony (20.2 per cent) and Mecklen-
burg-Hither Pomerania (16.6 per cent) 
and lows in Berlin (9.4 per cent) and 
Thuringia (11.0 per cent), giving an ag-
gregate 9.3 per cent for the CEECs’ 
share of Germany’s trade. The study 
emphasizes that countries and regions in 
geographical proximity to the CEECs are 
particularly affected by trade. On the 
one hand, this causes pressure on 
wages and employment in these regions, 
as concluded in several sections. On the 
other hand, it also provides remarkable 
trade opportunities for companies in 
Eastern German regions.85 
Besides trade and growth poten-
tials, these border regions will be 
greatly affected by changes in national 
and EU subsidies. The authors of one 
report in 200286 presented changes in 
EU subsidies resulting from Enlargement 
and its impacts on Eastern German 
                                                 
85 Boeri and Brücker 2000, pp. 36–8. 
86 Rosenfeld and Kronthaler 2002. 
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companies. They mention that average 
GDP in the enlarged EU will decrease 
by about 13 per cent from first-round 
Enlargement and by as much as 18 per 
cent from the second round, including 
Romania and Bulgaria. This in turn will 
have an impact on EU regional and 
structural policies. Since most Eastern 
German regions belong to the category 
of target-1 areas for regional subsidies, 
they will be affected to a remarkable 
extent. Criteria for subsidization in this 
category is a regional GDP per capita 
of less than 75 per cent of the EU av-
erage. Without Enlargement (the status 
quo scenario), the number of subsidized 
target-1 areas in the EU 15 for the pe-
riod 2000–2006 would increase from 
46 in 1999 to 60. After first-round 
Enlargement, though, the number will 
decrease to 29 and after the second 
round to 19. Eastern Germany is espe-
cially affected, as there are nine target-
1 areas in Germany in the status quo 
scenario.87 After a first Enlargement 
round, though, this number decreases to 
two88 and after a second round only 
the district of Dessau remains in the 
target-1 area category. Altogether in the 
period 2000–2006, the funds for tar-
get-1 areas in Eastern Germany amount 
to around EUR 20 billion,89 with an 
additional EUR 0.75 billion for Eastern 
Berlin. Assuming that seven areas will 
no longer be target-1 after the first 
Enlargement round, these amounts make 
up fiscal losses by the federal states.90 
Saxony will still get EUR 1.9 billion for 
Chemnitz and Saxony-Anhalt EUR 1.3 
billion for Dessau, adding up to some 
EUR 0.5 billion a year over the 2000–
                                                 
87 The federal states of Brandenburg, Thuringia, 
Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, in Saxony the 
Chemnitz, Dresden and Leipzig districts, and in 
Saxony-Anhalt, the Dessau, Halle and Magde-
burg districts. 
88 Chemnitz and Dessau. 
89 EUR 5.8 billion for Saxony and some EUR 3.5 
billion for each of the other states. 
90 Except for Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. 
2006 period. This means that target-1 
area subsidies for Eastern Germany will 
decrease from an annual EUR 2.9 bil-
lion to EUR 0.5 billion. Also expected is 
a reduction in national subsidies for 
investments by private companies in af-
fected regions, so that they will suffer a 
double loss. New EU regulations limit 
subsidization for major investments over 
EUR 100 million, which was expected to 
apply in Eastern Germany by 2004. 
Concluding, the authors recommend that 
affected regions and companies reduce 
their location-specific disadvantages, es-
pecially by forcing expansion of infra-
structure, to use Eastern Enlargement as 
an incentive to reduce their regional 
competitive disadvantages.91 
In line with this advice is a rec-
ommendation in a comment on extended 
investment subsidies for Eastern German 
border regions in 2000.92 The author 
concludes that subsidies requiring bor-
der regions to reduce their location-
specific disadvantages would provide 
more effective incentives to improve 
competitiveness than investment subsidies 
would. 
Apart from the subsidy cuts men-
tioned so far, there are some increasing 
subsidies for the border regions coming 
from Community policies. The NUTS II93 
definition of border regions covers eight 
areas of Germany: Lower Bavaria, 
Oberpfalz, Oberfranken, Brandenburg, 
Berlin, Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, 
Chemnitz and Dresden. There is an EU 
paper devoted to development of the 
main source of Community regional aid, 
i.e., subsidies from structural funds at 
the levels of Objectives 1 and 2. Of 
these funds, the states of Mecklenburg-
Hither Pomerania, Brandenburg and 
Saxony, directly bordering the CEECs, 
                                                 
91 Ibid., pp. 266–73. 
92 Heimpold 2000, p. 466. 
93 I.e., the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics. 
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will receive some EUR 10.4 billion in the 
2000–2006 period.94 Community sup-
port for Berlin amounts to roughly EUR 
1 billion in the same period. This in-
cludes Objective 1 support of EUR 0.688 
billion to Eastern Berlin in the 2000–
2005 period and Objective 2 support of 
EUR 0.384 billion to Western Berlin in 
2000–2006. Bavaria’s Objective 2 pro-
gramme, which covers regions along the 
entire border with the Czech Republic, 
receives some EUR 0.537 billion in 
2000–2006. The EU will also pay cross-
border subsidies from its INTERREG95 
funds for border regions, a total of 
EUR 4.875 billion in 2000–2006. For 
Germany, these will amount to EUR 
0.627 billion for cross-border coopera-
tion programmes in 2000–6,96 of which 
67 per cent is dedicated to border re-
gions in Germany. Bavaria’s share, 
about EUR 60 million, represents an 
increase in average annual amounts of 
196 per cent over the 1994–9 period.97 
4) CONCLUSION 
Several theories on economic integration 
have already advanced highly abstract 
theoretical models of the benefits of in-
tegration to all parties. Calculations do 
indeed point to mutual benefits from 
the first EU Eastern Enlargement, for 
the 10 CEECs and for the EU 15, with 
Germany generally among the winning 
                                                 
94 The total was EUR 8.4 billion in 1994–9. 
95 Funding for INTERREG III (the latest phase of 
the EU’s INTERREG Community Initiative for re-
gional policy) comes from the European Regional 
Development Fund, one of the Structural Funds. 
A total of EUR 4.875 billion is available for 
2000–2006 period, split over three strands: 
cross-border (A), transnational (B) and interre-
gional (C). 
96 Compared with EUR 0.419 billion for 1994–9. 
97 European Commission 2001, pp. 13–14. 
group, if not the main winner by the 
Enlargement. 
This is not a priority favoured by 
the German public. Surveys suggest that 
people do not support it in high num-
bers, although they see no reason to 
oppose it vigorously either. Many think 
it will not affect them personally. Ger-
mans believe the arguments of their 
government and the EU that Enlarge-
ment brings political advantages, but 
they are less convinced about economic 
benefits. They feel exposed to waves of 
migration affecting their labour market 
and welfare system. 
With the financing of Eastern 
Enlargement, Germany, as the largest 
net contributor to the EU budget, will 
certainly face a huge inescapable fiscal 
burden. Rather pessimistic studies calcu-
late a net present value of fiscal costs 
at EUR 132.4 billion for the first round 
of 10 CEECs, rising to EUR 220 billion 
for a second round including Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey. These give in-
creases in Germany’s net contributions 
to the EU budget of 0.4 per cent and 
0.6 per cent, respectively. Other studies 
expect Germany’s net contributions after 
the first Enlargement to rise from EUR 
6.1 billion in 2002 to EUR 9.5–11.6 bil-
lion in 2007 and EUR 10.4–13.7 billion 
up to 2013, after a second round. The 
precise course of Germany’s net contri-
butions to the EU budget will depend 
on the extent to which the structural 
policies and CAP are reformed.  
Impacts of increasing FDI and 
capital movements from Germany to the 
CEECs are expected to bring negligible 
crowding-out effects on investment in 
Germany, except in manufacturing and 
processing industries that might be 
negatively affected by cost-oriented FDI 
to the CEECs. 
Benefits for Germany from an 
Enlargement may, on the one hand, 
come from increasing trade with the 
CEECs. Optimistic calculations see 50 
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per cent increases, since the effects of 
complete single-market access for the 
CEECs are expected to be much greater 
than those of tariff cuts agreed earlier 
in the Europe Agreements. More pessi-
mistic studies note that shares of CEECs 
in all Germany’s trade are generally too 
small to make a noticeable impact, with 
textiles, clothing and metal industries as 
well as agriculture being the exceptions. 
If the increased trade has any notable 
effects on the German labour market, 
low-skilled employees in such labour-
intensive industries may lose, while 
highly skilled labour in high-technology 
industries gains. 
On the other hand, benefits are 
expected in the form of general eco-
nomic growth from export-led expan-
sion, followed by improving terms of 
trade with the CEECs and increasing 
wages for highly skilled and low-skilled 
workers. GDP growth of 0.44–0.63 per 
cent for the years 2005–10 and an ad-
ditional welfare gain of 0.375 per cent 
are calculated for Germany. 
Industries affected most in Ger-
many will be agriculture, textiles, cloth-
ing and chemicals, while food and metal 
processing will suffer less. The agricul-
tural sector in Germany is thought to 
be the main loser by increasing competi-
tion and additional supply caused by 
price differentials. 
The main impacts of Enlargement 
on the German economy are likely to 
come from East-West migration. The 
calculated overall migration potentials 
imply an annual increase in residents 
from the 10a CEECs in Germany of 
about 218,000 in 2002, declining to 
about 162,000 a year in 2005, 95,600 
in 2010, 27,500 in 2020 and 1,500 in 
2030. Thus there will be an increase of 
about 2,000,000 residents from the 10a 
CEECs in Germany over the 2002–30 
period, so that Germany bears two-
thirds of all the migration potential for 
the EU 15. 
Impacts of this migration potential 
on the German labour market are ex-
pected, such as crowding-out effects for 
low-skilled workers in Germany’s manu-
facturing and construction industries. 
Studies generally conclude that incomes 
of low-skilled workers will decrease and 
those of highly skilled workers slightly 
increase if the immigrants are mainly 
low-skilled workers, while incomes of 
highly skilled workers will slightly de-
crease and those of low-skilled workers 
increase if immigrants are mainly highly 
skilled workers. No noticeable impacts 
of immigration on unemployment in the 
destination country have been found, 
export for a slight bias towards increas-
ing unemployment among low-skilled 
workers. The EIC/DIW-study, based on 
an immigration potential of 200,000 a 
year over a period of 10–15 years ex-
pects decreasing wages (0.81 per cent) 
and increasing unemployment (0.54 per 
cent). Low-skilled workers, especially in 
regions directly bordering the CEECs, 
will face sharper income cuts than 
highly skilled workers. However, most 
studies expect the impacts of immigra-
tion on the German labour markets to 
be modest. 
A high share of the migration po-
tential is connected with dysfunctional 
incentives deriving from higher social-
security benefits in Germany than in the 
CEECs. Although the calculations differ 
widely, it can be assumed that immi-
grants to Germany are net recipients 
from the welfare system, which results 
in additional artificial migration incen-
tives, especially among low-skilled work-
ers and thereby in the short run in an 
enlarged migration potential for Ger-
many. The resulting fiscal burden may 
encourage the destination country to 
reduce such benefits across the board, 
so that erosive forces of competition 
among EU welfare systems may evolve. 
Although all studies agree that 
Germany is most likely to have the 
highest net benefits from Enlargement, 
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these may be rather unevenly allocated 
beneficiaries and there will probably be 
winners and losers. Agriculture and 
food processing are expected to be los-
ers, while chemicals, metal processing, 
textiles and clothing industries will bene-
fit. There are losses expected, especially 
for low-skilled labour in certain labour-
intensive industries in regions directly 
bordering the CEECs, i.e. the new fed-
eral states in Eastern Germany and re-
gions in Eastern Bavaria. In Bavaria, 
processing industries, construction and 
demand-oriented services are likely to 
be most affected by immigration. Un-
derdeveloped border regions will face 
fiscal cuts derived from reorganization 
of EU structural policies.  
On top of these regional losses, 
there are some general structural prob-
lems in Germany’s labour market and 
welfare system likely to dominate politi-
cal discussion in the coming years, as 
they already do as this paper is written. 
The German labour market, like most in 
Western Europe, has an overload of 
restrictions and inflexibility, i.e. inflexible 
and restricted working conditions, rigid 
wages and powerful unions. These re-
strictions will probably erect barriers 
for positive welfare effects on the Ger-
man labour market by immigration of 
highly skilled labour, as rigid wages will 
prevent positive employment effects. 
However, the German government has 
probably managed to mitigate negative 
effects of migration on the labour mar-
ket and the welfare system in the early 
years, by pushing for transitional peri-
ods of limited movement of labour. As 
migration potentials and impacts on la-
bour markets and the welfare system 
will probably be postponed for the tran-
sitional periods, this success in negotia-
tions should not be abused as a chance 
for the political elites in Germany to 
avoid implementing necessary structural 
reforms. 
When analysing potential impacts 
of Eastern Enlargement on the German 
economy today, and maybe in a future 
follow-up review, it is necessary to look 
for causality. There has to be clear dif-
ferentiation between effects of Enlarge-
ment and consequences of restrictions 
and inflexibility on the German labour 
market or wrong incentives in the wel-
fare system. Although Germany’s politi-
cal elites need to give top priority to 
ending such dysfunctional incentives and 
inflexibility, there is also a need for ob-
jective evaluation by economists, to pre-
vent misleading calculations of net re-
sults making the first EU Eastern 
Enlargement a scapegoat for inadequate 
and insufficient political reforms, instead 
of opening up prospects of for further 
Enlargement rounds covering Turkey, 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
* * * * * 
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Table 1 
Germany's part of the EU budget 
 
 
Operating expenditures of 
the EU budget to Germany 
in EUR million and percent-
ages of all operating expen-
ditures 
Germany's total contributions 
to the EU budget in mn 
EUR and % of all contribu-
tions 
Germany's net contributions 
to the EU budget in mn 
EUR and % of the EU 
budget 
1996 10,088.8 20,742.6 10,653.8 
% 14.8  29.2  14.4  
1997 10,141.1 21,217.3 11,076.2 
% 14.2 28.2 14.0 
1998 10,275.3 20,633.0 10,357.7 
% 14.3 25.1 10.8 
1999 9,852.7 21,069.0 11,216.3 
% 13.9 25.5 11.6 
2000 10,232.8 21,774.9 11,542.1 
% 14.0 24.8 10.8 
2001 10,205.1 19,727.2 9,522.1 
% 14.8 24.4 9.6 
2002 11,532.3 17,582.2 6,049.9 
% 15.9 22.6 6.7 
Source: European Commission (2003B): Allocation of 2002 EU Operating Expenditure by Member State; 
September 2003, and own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Net present value of fiscal costs of Enlargement for Germany 
(assuming the CEECs get the same aid from structural funds as 
Spain and Portugal after the Southern Enlargement) 
 
 Germany EU-15 
First round of 10 CEECs 132.4 542.6 
Second round of Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey 220.5 903.8 
Third round of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine 396.8 1626.1 
Source: Dicke, H. (2003): Die Beitrittsvertrüge der EU - Eine Bilanzierung; 
Institut für Weltwirtschaft; Kieler Arbeitspapier Nr. 1157; 
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Table 3 
Projection of Germany's future contributions to the EU budget 
 
 
Germany's contributions to the 2007 EU budget in various reform scenarios for EU 25, EUR millions 
 
Status quo EU-25 Moderate reforms EU-25 Medium reforms EU-25 Substantial reforms EU-25 
2007 
Agriculture Structural Net pay-ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments 
Germany 6,694.0 2,785.0 -11,127.0 4,486.0 1,895.0 -11,604.0 5,982.0 1,895.0 -9,754.0 5,982.0 1,877.0 -9,537.0 
EU 15  41,809.0 22,309.0 -17,351.0 30,043.0 17,054.0 -27,042.0 37,704.0 17,054.0 -14,948.0 37,704.0 15,968.0 -15,104.0 
 
Germany's contributions to the 2013 EU budget in various reform scenarios for EU 25, EUR millions 
 
Status quo EU-25 Moderate reforms EU-25 Medium reforms EU-25 Substantial reforms EU-25 
2013 
Agriculture Structural Net pay-ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments 
Germany 6,156.0 671.0 -11,655.0 4,177.0 217.0 -12,256.0 3,605.0 217.0 -9,743.0 3,605.0 96.0 -9,037.0 
EU 15 38,239.0 11,787.0 -23,042.0 27,702.0 9,105.0 -31,732.0 24,333.0 9,105.0 -20,193.0 24,333.0 5,494.0 -20,539.0 
 
Germany's contributions to the 2007 EU budget in various reform scenarios for EU 27, EUR millions 
 
Status quo EU-25 Moderate reforms EU-25 Medium reforms EU-25 Substantial reforms EU-25 
2007 
Agriculture Structural Net pay-ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments 
Germany 6,694.0 2,463.0 -12,140.0 4,486.0 1,754.0 -12,435.0 6,982.0 1,754.0 -12,435.0 5,982.0 1,691.0 -10,423.0 
EU 15 41,809.0 19,573.0 -22,818.0 30,043.0 16,035.0 -30,788.0 37,704.0 16,035.0 -18,608.0 37,704.0 15,013.0 -18,824.0 
 
Germany's contributions to the 2007-EU budget in various reform-scenarios for a EU-27 in mn EUR 
 
Status quo EU-25 Moderate reforms EU-25 Medium reforms EU-25 Substantial reforms EU-25 
2013 
Agriculture Structural Net pay-ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments Agriculture Structural 
Net pay-
ments 
Germany 6,156.0 414.0 12,813.0 4,177.0 407.0 -13,673.0 3,605.0 407.0 -10,942.0 3,605.0 93.0 -10,390.0 
EU 15 38,239.0 7,224.0 -31,170.0 27,702.0 9,270.0 -37,922.0 24,333.0 9,270.0 -25,516.0 24,333.0 5,357.0 -26,009.0 
Source: Weise, C. (2002): How to Finance Eastern Enlargement of the EU; Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin; Discussion Paper 287; Berlin, 
June 
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Table 4 
Long-run macroeconomic 
effects on Germany 
 
 Changes in 
Consumer prices -0.241 
Investment prices -0.085 
Intermediate prices -0.135 
Domestic producer prices 0.074 
Terms of trade with CEECs 7.210 
Exports to CEECs 46.798 
Exports to EU 14 0.677 
Exports to ROW 1.137 
Highly skilled labour 0.576 
Low-skilled labour wages 0.560 
Disposable wage income 0.498 
Overall consumption 0.741 
Highly skilled labour 0.035 
Low-skilled labour supply 0.031 
Sum of capital stocks 0.557 
Output 0.550 
GDP 0.449 
Welfare, as % of GDP 0.375 
Net foreign debts 0.101 
Source: Keuschnigg, C. et al. (1999): East-
ern to the EU: Economic Costs and Benefits 
for the EU Member States? Germany; Final 
Report on Study September 
Table 5 
Integration effects of 
EU Eastern Enlargement on Germany 
(Cumulative derivations of baseline in % of real GDP) 
 
  
German EU 
2005 0.15 0.07 
Trade  
2008 0.10 0.05 
2005 0.50 0.40 
Single market  
2008 0.37 0.33 
2005 -0.07 -0.07 
FDI flows to  
2008 -0.12 -0.16 
2005 0.06 0.05 
Migration to  
2008 0.23 0.06 
2005 -0.01 0.03 
Costs of  
2008 -0.01 -0.03 
2005 0.63 0.42 
Total 
2008 0.48 0.26 
2005 0.73  
Personal incomes in real 
2008 0.76  
2005 -0.42  
Consumer  
2008 -0.43  
2005 0.09  
Total  
2008 0.47  
2005 0.11  
Unemployment 
2008 -0.21  
2005 0.04  
Current 
2008 0.24  
2005 0.11  
Budget 
2008 0.29  
Source: Breuss, F. (2001): Macroeconomic effects of 
EU Enlargement for Old and New Members; Austrian 
Institute of Economic Research; WIFO Working Pa-
pers No. 143; March 2001 
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Table 6 
Sectoral effects on supply and demand in German industries 
(changes in %) 
 
  Agriculture 
and Forest Food 
Textiles 
and Cloth-
ing 
Chemicals Metal processing
Domestic producer prices -0.03 -0.43 -0.63 -0.27 -0.04 
Demand of highly skilled labour -3.61 -0.81 0.96 1.76 0.86 
Demand of low-skilled labour -3.59 -0.80 0.97 1.78 0.87 
Output -3.13 0.15 2.18 2.60 1.40 
Cut in external EU-tariffs 9.77 10.20 8.64 5.59 7.27 
Decline in the real trade costs with the CEECs 4.62 5.56 9.23 4.78 4.17 
Trade elasticity 3.92 3.50 3.92 2.58 2.79 
Change in domestic demand -3.46 0.24 -4.90 1.19 0.33 
Change in imports from CEECs 133.08 243.03 179.24 47.10 36.69 
Change in exports to the CEECs 20.56 86.15 137.74 41.64 45.90 
Source: Keuschnigg, C. et al. (1999): Eastern Enlargement to the EU: Economic Costs and Benefits for the 
EU Present Final Report on Study XIX/B1/9801; 
 
 
Table 7 
Sectoral effects of removing tariffs in Germany 
 
Adoption of the 
 Relative changes of
production in 
Non-metallic minerals 0.2 
Energy-intensive products 0.2 
Metals 0.2 
Machinery and equipment 0.2 
Raw materials 0.2 
Transport and communication 0.2 
Fabricated metal products 0.1 
Electronic equipment 0.1 
Food processing -1.8 
Textiles and leather -0.4 
Agriculture 0.0 
General manufacturing 0.0 
Transport equipment 0.0 
Trade services 0.0 
Financial services 0.0 
Services in general 0.0 
Source: Lejour, A et al. (2001 B): EU Enlargement: 
Economic for Countries and Industries; CPB Nether-
lands Bureau for Policy Analysis; CPB Document No. 
011; September 
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Table 8 
DIW-calculations on migration potential for Germany 
 
Migration potential from the 10a-CEECs - Calculation by the DIW in 
 2002 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
 Baseline Projection for EU 15 
Stock of immigrants 1,159,804 1,987,718 2,907,367 3,437,146 3,721,613 3,853,542 3,892,345
in % of EU 15 population 0.31 0.53 0.78 0.93 1.01 1.06 1.08
 
Baseline Projection for Germany 
increase in the number 
of immigrants 
218,429 161,722 95,560 53,720 27,509 11,320 1,539
Stock of immigrants 754,328 1,292,798 1,890,932 2,235,498 2,420,512 2,506,321 2,531,556
 
Low Projection for Germany 
Increase in the number 
of immigrants 
175,189 126,204 68,758 33,444 12,187 -201 -7,039
Stock of immigrants 711,088 1,136,369 1,585,359 1,815,231 1,914,263 1,935,258 1,912,013
 
High Projection for German 
Increase in the number 
of immigrants  
241,443 183,537 114,117 69,565 41,062 22,912 11,437
Stock of immigrants 777,342 1,383,485 2,080,670 2,509,670 2,766,918 2,914,491 2,992,507
Source: Boeri, T. and Brücker, H. (2000): The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and La-
bour Markets in the European Integration Consortium; Berlin and Milano 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Long-run macroeconomic effects on Germany 
 
 Impacts of 
total migration 
Impacts just 
of low-skilled 
migrants 
Impacts just 
of the skilled 
migrants 
Unemployment rate of domestic low-skilled labour 
(on a basis of 10.000%) 
10.402 10.544 9.879 
Unemployment rate of domestic highly skilled   
(on a basis of 6.000%) 
5.890 5.912 5.977 
Average unemployment rate           
(on a basis of 6.668%) 
6.677 6.726 6.625 
Wage level of low-skilled labour -3.389 -4.251 0.921 
Wage level of highly skilled 1.353 1.174 0.171 
Source: Heijdra, B. et al. (2002): Eastern Enlargement of the EU: Jobs, Investments and Welfare in Pre-
sent CESifo Working Paper No. 718 (7); May 
 
